A Reading of Kuhn in Light of Heidegger
as a Response to Hoeller's Critique of Giorgi

Brent Dean Robbins
Duquesne University

 ...I would say that at least two options are open for
  psychology. Either psychology can understand itself
  as a science with a different and broader interpretation
  of this (scientific attitude). Or it can understand itself
  as another kind of discipline, that is, as a discipline
  which organizes its knowledge in another way.
      - Robert Romanyshyn (1978)

  The fundamentally human element consists in the fact that
  the forms of human behavior must continually be sought
  and defined anew and are therefore discovered in the
  historical role of man and in the elucidation of that role;
  it is history which differentiates the human being from
  the animal.
      - Ernesto Grassi (1976)

       In Psychology as a Human Science, Giorgi (1970) argues that a phenomenologically- oriented human science is an alternative "paradigm" to the current tradition of natural science psychology. Utilizing Kuhn's (1962) conception of science as consisting of periods of revolution, which are followed by periods of "normal science," Giorgi takes up the banner of phenomenological psychology as a competing "paradigm" for the next period of "normal science" in the history of psychology. However, as Hoeller (1978-79) has argued, there seems to be an inherent contradiction between a phenomenological approach and Kuhn's conception of "normal science." As a result, it becomes necessary to examine the potential consequences of conceptualizing the possibility of phenomenological psychology as a "normal science."
       Along with other theorists (Hoeller, 1978-79, Rouse, 1981), I will argue that Kuhn's ontic investigation of science can be enriched in light of Heidegger's (1927) provisional ontological inquiry in Being and Time. Moreover, it will be necessary to elucidate how a reading of Kuhn may be approached differently based on the "later" writings of Heidegger following his "turning" in the 1930's. Based on this investigation, I will show that, in order to be truly phenomenological, psychology must arise from an understanding of human beings as radically social and radically historical. In the spirit of Heidegger's call to take up "meditative thinking" in response to the "calculative thinking" which pervades our culture, a phenomenological psychology may begin to recollect the past as the latent meaning and ground of the present, and, thereby, open up new future possibilities. Heidegger's understanding of history can provide the groundwork to build such a psychology in our technological age.
       Kuhn's Structure, as a center of controversy in contemporary philosophy of science, demonstrates the value of this type of historical inquiry. However, while Kuhn runs the risk of being discounted as an "idealist" and "irrationalist," Heidegger's thought can provide the foundation upon which to shed light on the crisis of science in our age -- which is, in part, aroused by Kuhn's bold project. While Giorgi seems somewhat naive to the dangers of conceptualizing phenomenological psychology as a potential "normal science," it is hoped this investigation can provide an alternative path for a phenomenological psychology.
       The following investigation consists of four major parts:

       I. An investigation of the place of Kuhn's (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions within the traditional orientations of the philosophy of science; namely, logical positivism, transcendental idealism, and contemporary scientific realism.
       II. Following Rouse's (1982) investigation, I will examine how Kuhn's Structure can be understood in the light of the "early" Heidegger's (1927) Being and Time.
       III. I will address the question: "Can phenomenological psychology be conceptualized as a 'paradigm' for 'normal science'?" This question will be addressed based on a reading of Heidegger's "later" thought; particularly, his understanding of 'history' (Gestell).
        IV. I will offer a critique of Hoeller's (1978-79) understanding of "normal science" as "inauthentic" and "revolutionary science" as "authentic." Hoeller's turn to the "authentic/inauthentic" distinction of Heidegger's Being and Time, I will argue, contradicts his intention to view phenomenological psychology from the perspective of "later" Heidegger.


       Kuhn's (1962/1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions grows out of an effort to approach science from a historical perspective: to discover how the historian of science can "determine by what man and at what point in time each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory was discovered or invented" (p. 2). Further, the historian must account for the "cogeries of error, myth, and superstition that have inhibited the more rapid accumulation of the constituents of the modern scientific text" (p. 2). As Kuhn discovers, this appears to be an almost impossible project; for, the historian who relies on the "concept of development-by- accumulation" must inevitably run into difficulties. Kuhn's entire project is an elaboration of the nature of these difficulties.
       Yet, what could possibly be the alternative to "the concept of development-by- accumulation"? Here lies one of Kuhn's greatest contributions to the philosophy of science: His claim that periods of scientific research, called "paradigms," are "incommensurable." From this claim, Kuhn proceeds to argue that the appearance of fluid, incremental progress in science is an illusion. Past "paradigms" are reinterpreted by current "paradigms" to appear as if researchers of the past had been involved in the same projects as current researchers. Current historians of science read the past texts of science from the perspective of their own, dominant paradigm; thus, they view past research as less competent attempts to disclose the same world. On the contrary, Kuhn claims that researchers in the past and present paradigms "live in different worlds" (p. 193). It is essentially this contention that has led many contemporary philosophers of science (i.e., Suppe, 1977; Scheffler, 1967, 1972; Shapere, 1971; Shimony, 1976; Boyd, 1983) to discount Kuhn as an "idealist" and/or "irrationalist." Therefore, through an examination of Kuhn's place within the context of contemporary philosophy of science, it is necessary to demonstrate how Kuhn's ambiguous use of the term "world," which lies at the heart of his "theory of world constitution," need not be taken up as "idealist" in nature (i.e., Kantian) (Hoyningen-Huene, 1990).
       Suppe (1981), as cited by Rouse (1981), examines "four principal factors," largely derived from a commitment to realism, which account for the criticisms laid upon Kuhn. Suppe first points out that Kuhn belongs in the anti-realist school of thought, along with the positivists. Thus, Suppe's first criticism is that "Kuhn extends the positivist's antirealism treatment of theoretical terms to observation terms as well" (Rouse, 1981, p. 270). Considering the three traditional approaches to the philosophy of science (consisting, on the one hand, of the antirealism of logical positivism and transcendental idealism, and, on the other hand, of contemporary scientific realism), Suppe uses a process of elimination. If Kuhn is not a logical positivist nor a realist, he must, therefore, be an idealist. However, while Kuhn's social constructivism can be taken up from the perspective of idealism, it will become clear that this is not his intention. Further, a reading of Kuhn in the light of Heidegger's (1927) provisional ontology in Being & Time will demonstrate that there is another alternative. Before this path can be taken, however, it is necessary to demonstrate how Kuhn differs from the logical positivist school of antirealism.
       The logical positivists were empiricists in the tradition of Hume, and acquired the latter half of its name from Comte's 19th century theory of intellectual evolution -- as moving from the "theological" to the  "metaphysical," and, finally, arriving at the "positive." With a radical skepticism which took almost nothing for granted, the positivists held the banner for a "seeing is believing" approach to science. In particular, the logical positivists incorporated the mathematical logic of Frege and Russell as a "subject-neutral language" in order to provide "mathematically precise and unambiguous meanings" (Klee, 1997, p. 30). Because the logical positivists did not wish to make assumptions regarding unobserveable phenomenon, such as causes and effects, "material conditionals" (derived from mathematical logic) were developed to "represent external relations between objects, properties, or events to which formal symbols (material conditionals) referred" (Klee, 1997, p. 31). For example, the "horseshoe" symbolizes the English equivalent of "if,...then," wherein, if the former is true, the latter must be true in all cases.
       Aside from these purely mathematical symbols, scientific theories contain "substantive symbols," of which there are two kinds: Observational terms and theoretical terms, the former referring to observable objects, properties, or events and the latter referring to non-observable objects, properties, or events. This system allowed the logical positivists to set up a way to distinguish science from pseudo-science by adopting the use of "correspondence rules" ("c- rules"). By defining the meanings of theoretical terms in observational terms via c-rules, the logical positivists hoped to provide science with a way to avoid developing fictional entities, such as phlogiston or aether, and, more generally, to provide a way for science to avoid metaphysical claims. For the positivists, in short, theoretical entities do not exist unless they can be shown, via c-rules, to "make a difference to observational experience" (Klee, 1997, p. 35).
       Today, few philosophers of science conform to the logical positivist viewpoint. The undoing of the logical positivist approach to science is due to its inability to distinguish between observational and theoretical terms: a distinction which the conception of the "c-rule" took for granted (Klee, 1997, pp. 41-61). Further, as the Quine-Duhem Thesis demonstrated: "Any seemingly disconfirming observational evidence can always be accommodated to any theory" (Klee, 1997, p. 65). In other words, human beings do not arrive at scientific evidence by merely conforming to the evidence provided by nature; rather, human beings select which theories to choose according to "inferential decisions" based on pragmatics (that is, what best fits in with the current holism of the aggregate of scientific beliefs held at the time). At least theoretically, at the "limit of scientific inquiry, (defined by Klee (1997) as "a fictional point in the future when science has evolved as close to a completed form as it can get without actually being perfected") no single theory will prevail as the, one true theory. Instead, the  "underdetermination of theory" argument holds that, instead, "a host of mutually inconsistent but equally adequate (to the observational evidence) theories" will remain (Duhem, 1982; Quine, 1960, 1961, 1976, 1990; Quine & Ullian, 1970).
       Returning to Suppe's criticism of Kuhn: Yes, Kuhn does extend logical positivism's radical skepticism of theoretical terms to observational terms. Doing so, Kuhn is simply keeping in step with the currency of contemporary philosophy of science. Moreover, Suppe's effort to discount Kuhn's antirealism arises from the motivation of realism to maintain logical positivism's notion of  progress.  It follows that Suppe's second objection is that Kuhn "shortchanges the role of rationality in the growth of scientific knowledge" (pp. 647-48). However, while Kuhn is calling the traditional notion of scientific progress into question, it does not follow that his theory is "irrational." However, it does seem to discover an "irrational" element at the heart of the entire scientific enterprise. Therefore, in order to save science from dissolving into a groundless relativism, Suppe and other realists must argue that Kuhn is an "idealist" who "makes discoverable how the world really is irrelevant to scientific knowledge" (Suppe, 1977, p. 648). Aside from logical positivism, Heidegger's existential-phenomenological conception of human beings as being-in-the-world remains a third alternative between realism and idealism. Nevertheless, this is an alternative which Kuhn himself does not take up -- the result being an inherent ambiguity in his use of the term "world" which, when all is said and done, he resigns himself to. Kuhn (1962) writes:

       In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of competing paradigms
       practice their trades in different worlds...Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of
       scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction.
       Again, that is not to say that they can see anything they please. Both are looking at the
       world, and what they look at has not changed. But in some areas they see different things,
       and they see them in different relations to one another. That is why a law that cannot even
       be demonstrated to one group of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to
       another. (p. 150).

       Essentially, Kuhn is saying that scientists of different paradigms live both in the same world and live in different worlds. Yet, is this not a contradiction in terms? How can this be possible? Hoyningen-Huene (1990) points out the two senses of "world" alluded to by Kuhn. The first sense of the term "world" refers to a world that is "already perceptually and conceptually subdivided in a certain way" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 129). This is the world of the "subjective" pole which organizes nature according to the conceptual structure imposed, a priori, by human beings. The second sense of the term is, therefore, the "purely object-sided" sense of "world," which "is left if one subtracts all these human contributions, all this perceptual and conceptual structuring from the world in the first sense" (Hoyningen-Huene, 1990, p. 485). As Hoyningen- Huene (1990) elaborates: "This world bears, of course, great similarity to Kant's 'thing in itself' although it is not identical with it" (p. 485). As this analysis shows, Kuhn's conception of "world," in both senses, runs the risk of falling prey to a kind of idealism which creates a subject-object dualism, wherein the "object"-pole remains inaccessible, and, therefore, arbitrary. Kuhn is left vulnerable to a realist critique which can easily disintegrate his debate to a vicious circle. As Hoyningen-Huene (1990) elaborates:

       ...The attempt to construct a general theory of world constitution leads to an                       uncomfortable situation that the means to reach that goal also render its attainment impossible.   The attempt  to analyze the constitution of reality in a general an unbiased way, independently of one's own  idea of reality, seems predestined to fail because one has to use one's idea of reality - otherwise  one never gets started. Once one gets started, one must necessarily fail. (p. 492).

       Here, Hoyningen-Huene, without apparent recognition, refers to the hermeneutical circle. And it is just this dillemna that a hermeneutic phenomenology, as provided by Heidegger, can be of service by recognizing the centrality of interpretation. To understand, one must interpret. But this need not be a vicious circle. It means that one must enter the circle in the right way. For Heidegger, this move is conducted by beginning with one's implicit, "average everyday" understanding and working through this towards an explicit understanding of that which, when implicit, remains concealed (Packer & Addison, 1989). And, therefore, it is to Heidegger's (1927) provisional ontological inquiry in Being and Time that we may turn in order to shed light on Kuhn's investigation of science. In turn, it will also become possible to reveal the danger inherent in the realist conception of science.


       "Kuhn is admittedly an antirealist," writes Rouse (1981): "he explicitly denies any nontrivial application of a correspondence theory of truth to science, and rejects realist interpretations of scientific terms, whether observational or theoretical" (p. 270). However, as argued above, this does not imply that he is an "idealist." At the core of Kuhn's theory, he speaks to the problem of how science can gain access to things. For Kuhn, this access is always via a "paradigm," a socially-constructed project of what counts as legitimate research and, in turn, what counts as legitimate ends to that research. The realist, on the other hand, would argue that "in scientific investigation we have direct and unsullied access to the things themselves" (p. 270). Yet, to argue against such a direct access to things, Kuhn treads close to the pitfalls of an epistemology which must explain the "distinction between an interpretive scheme and the uninterpreted content to which it is applied" (Rouse, 1981, p. 270). Heidegger, on the other hand, understands the human beings as already being-in-the-world; therefore, there is no longer a need to solve the subject-object dilemma. Further, while Heidegger provides an ontological investigation of Being and Dasein, Kuhn provides Heidegger with the possibility of generating an ontic interpretation of science which may follow from his provisional ontology. The investigations of Kuhn and Heidegger are therefore complementary, and, together, they provide a means to critique the realist view of science.
       There are several realist accounts of science with which to dialogue. However, Boyd's (1983) particular brand of realism, in my assessment, provides the greatest challenge. In his defense of scientific realism, Boyd aligns himself with some aspects of empiricism and constructivism, while discarding other aspects of these anti-realist arguments. The ground upon which Boyd attacks both empiricism and constructivism is his argument that "a realistic account of scientific theories is...the only scientifically plausible explanation for the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology" (Boyd, p. 207). Boyd agrees with the empiricist's insistence on grounding evidence on "observables," yet he disagrees that "observables" and "non- observables" (the theoretical) can ever be truly distinguished, nor should they. In this sense, Boyd aligns himself with the constructivist's critique of empiricism, while discarding the constructivist's notion of incommensurable paradigms. As opposed to the constructivist, Boyd argues that theories involve "successive approximations" to the "truth" (Boyd, p. 203). Therefore, theories involve a progress toward explaining an independent, external reality.
       For Boyd (1983), both the empiricist and the constructivist fail to explain the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology which:

       ...can only be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the theoretical claims   embodied in the background theories determine those judgements are relevantly approximately true, and that scientific methodology acts dialectically so as to produce in the long run an increasingly accurate theoretical picture of the world. (Boyd, p. 207)

       Boyd backs up his argument by an appeal to "naturalism," in which the senses are understood as "causally reliable detectors of external objects" (p. 218). Based on this assumption, Boyd is able to argue that the external reality of nature imposes itself upon the theory, rather than vice versa. In turn, scientists continuously mold theories to conform to these impositions. In this way, Boyd can argue that Kuhn's "revolutions" are not between incommensurable paradigms. For Boyd, "anomalies," as presented by Kuhn, emerge because a theory does not conform to a theory-independent world, and, in turn, a "scientific revolution" involves an adjustment of the theory to better fit the "real" phenomena of the external world (Boyd, p. 203). Otherwise, Boyd debates, theories would indeed be arbitrary, and, would not, as they appear to do, demonstrate such instrumental success (i.e., technology).
       From a reading of Heidegger, in the light of Kuhn, it should become apparent that science and technology reside within the same underlying framework or "paradigm," and this, not a correspondence to an independent reality, accounts for the instrumental reliability of science. Boyd and other realists, who insist upon a self-evident reality  unassumingly play the role of covertly denying the latent meaning and ground of science and technology. Essentially, Boyd and his fellow realists provide an account of science which is a-historical and a-social, and, by doing so, fail to do justice to the changing nature of human beings, things, and the world.
       From the perspective of Heidegger's (1927) Being & Time, Kuhn's (1962) notion of "normal science" can be understood as science in its "average everydayness." Heidegger's existential analytic follows the progression from an analysis of Dasein, the human kind of being, in terms of that which is "closest" to it: its "average everyday," existentiell, pre-ontological, pre- thematic, "lived" understanding of itself, towards the hidden meaning and ground of Dasein's primordial existential structure which lies concealed in its "everyday" understanding. The "who" of "everyday" Dasein is that which is closest to Dasein. Yet, proximally and for the most part, one's own Dasein is not itself. This "who" of everyday Dasein is the "they" (das Man), which is characterized by "distantiality," "averageness" and "levelling down" and constitutes "publicness" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 165). The "they" is both everybody and nobody "to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 166). The "they- self" is the "not itself" of Dasein to be distinguished from authentic Dasein. Authentic Being- one's-Self, therefore, is an existentiell modification of the "they" as an essential existentiale, and, therefore, the former is the more primordial disclosure of Dasein.
       In order to understand science in its "average everydayness," it follows, Kuhn begins his investigation with the topic of "normal science." At least implicitly, Kuhn understands that any "authentic" disclosure of the practice of science must be a provisional disclosure of the science of das Man, the everybody and nobody which constitutes "publicness." From this understanding, we can concur with Kuhn's view of science as a group project. However, as Rouse (1982) points out, this should not be mistaken as a "consensus," since a "consensus" implies there is an "explicit belief of its members" (p. 275). On the contrary, the "world" of a "paradigm," within which a group of scientists practice, remains a "tacit" understanding of the common project which guides them. Kuhn (1962) writes:

       No consensus (among members of a research community) is required. If scientists...
       accepted a sufficient set of standard examples, they could model their own subsequent
       research on them without needing to agree about which set of characteristics these
       examples made them standard, ,justified their acceptance. (Scientists) agree in their
       identification of a paradigm without actually agreeing on, or attempting to produce, a
       full interpretation or rationalization of it (p. 44).

       A "normal science" is able to come to fruition whenever a group of practitioners are able to take their particular "paradigm for granted." The scientist is no longer required "to build his field anew, starting from first principles and justifying the use of each concept introduced" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 20). The scientist can get down to the busy-work of the "mopping-up operations" which characterize "normal science" (p. 24). However, this taken-for-grantedness becomes possible only within a shared understanding of the common research project. The "puzzle- solving" activity of "normal science" requires that there be at least a tacit understanding of what counts as a "puzzle" and, further, what counts as a solution to the puzzle. As Kuhn (1962) writes:

       One of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing
       problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to to have solutions.
       To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or
       encourage its members to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously
       been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline or sometimes
       as just too problematic to be worth the time. A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the
       community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form,
       because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm
       supplies. (p. 37)

       As Rouse (1982) points out, the "paradigm" of a "normal science" is the "common practice" of a group of researchers, consisting of "community standards and practices," which "maximize the intelligibility of what is done" (p. 275). No one -- that is, nobody and everybody (das Man) -- specifically legislates this common practice. It is the way the scientist is as everybody is in order to make sense of the world. Further, this implicit understanding, which arises from the ground of the research in a "paradigm," is embedded in the equipment of the researchers, which constitutes the "referential context of significance" of the scientific project. That is, this equipment is "already understood as being usable for some purpose" (Rouse, 1982, p. 272). The physical (instrumentation), methodological, and intellectual (laws and related theories, disciplinary matrix, shared exemplars) "equipment" of the researchers gain "significance" as they are encountered within the context of a "referential totality" -- the "in- order-for-the-sake-of" which implicitly guides the researcher in her "circumspective" understanding which always already projects the possibilities of what is and what is not counted as a "puzzle" to be solved (Rouse, 1982, p. 272). The scientist is guided by her pre-thematic understanding of the equipment "ready-to-hand" which "has its own kind of sight (circumspection), by which (her) manipulation is guided" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 98).  The explicit "rules" of a particular "paradigm," therefore, are part of the "equipment" of the "paradigm." However, the paradigm itself cannot be reduced to a set of explicit rules. As the meaning and ground of the explicit rules of a science, a paradigm's "rules" remain pre-thematic.
       This "implicit" or "tacit" understanding of a particular paradigm becomes "explicit" when there arises a crisis in the practice of research. According to Kuhn, such crises arise with the appearance of "anomalies" which the paradigm cannot account for. With the emergence of "anomalies," there are three possible resolutions: The "normal science" community may develop a resolution, the problems may be temporarily placed aside, or a new candidate paradigm will emerge. In each case, the paradigm, which had once been pre-thematic, becomes thematized. As a result, the "referential context of significance" shines forth as the "world" which the scientific practitioner is no longer able to "fall" into. As Rouse (1982) writes:

       Whether our equipment proves inadequate to the task, or the right equipment is not at our
       disposal, or something gets in our way, we become momentarily aware in a new way of the
       context of significance within which we work.The things we work with, which before we took
       for granted and were only aware of circumspectively, now stand out as objects of reflection.
       (p. 276)

       The scientific practitioner, one might say, is no longer able to flee into the "they-self" of inauthentic Dasein as "fallen." This phenomenon can be understood according to Heidegger's (1927) disclosure of Dasein as "care: [Sorge]: "Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered in the world." Through his analysis of anxiety, as a state-of-mind which provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being, Heidegger reveal's Dasein's Being to itself as care.
       "Falling," explains Heidegger, is a turning-away or fleeing of Dasein into its "they-self." This turning-away is grounded in anxiety. Anxiety is what makes fear possible.  Yet, unlike fear, in which that which threatens is other than Dasein, anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere and nothing. In anxiety, Dasein is not threatened by a particular thing or a collection of objects present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. In anxiety, first and foremost, the world as world is disclosed as that which one cannot fall into.
       Heidegger defined Being-in as "residing alongside" and "Being-familiar with." This Being-in is understood in the everyday publicness of the "they" as a "Being-at-home," a tranquilized self-assurance. However, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world' as "everyday familiarity collapses." Thus, Dasein is individualized as Being-in-the- world. Being-in enters into the existential mode of the "not-at-home" of uncanniness. Thus, "Being-not-at-home" is the basic kind of Being of Dasein, even though in an everyday way Dasein falls from this understanding in the tranquilized "at-homeness" of das Man.
       From an existential-ontological viewpoint, uncanniness ("not-at-home") is the more primordial phenomenon: the hidden meaning and ground of Dasein as fleeing into the "they" in its everyday concern and solicitude. It is this privative disclosure of Dasein as "authentic" which makes Kuhn's conception of "extraordinary science" understandable. With the disclosure of "the referential context of significance," the scientific practitioner is unable to "fall" into the "pre- scribed, circumscribed" world of the paradigm she works in (Sipiora, 1991). The scientist is no longer "at home" in the "world" of the paradigm. As Heidegger would say, the scientist who is immersed in the paradigm (conducting the "mopping-up" procedures of "normal science") has been tempted into the lostness of "the they" by the tranquility which disburdens her from having to face her ownmost potentiality-for-Being. However, unable to "fall" into the "they," the scientist is no longer caught within the circumspective concern of the paradigm as a "levelling down" which "glosses over everything that is original" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 127). New paradigms emerge to compete with the current paradigm once the current paradigm has, so to speak, shown its hand.
       Here we find the "essential tension" of which Kuhn speaks. On the one hand, the tradition of "normal science" in a particular paradigm makes progress of "puzzle-solving" possible by providing a shared intelligibility within which to work, as a group, in a common scientific project. However, in order to maintain the canniness of a tranquil "at-home-ness," the paradigm must conceal its latent meaning and ground. Unlike the puzzles one buys at the toy store, the puzzles of normal science do not come with explicit rules. It follows that "the self- interpretation of normal science" is "inadequate, for normal science conceals (its) vulnerability to disruption from us" (Rouse, 1982, p. 284). It is only when this disruption, via "anomalies," provides a crisis in the paradigm at hand that the "authentic" project of "extraordinary science" becomes possible. With Kuhn, Heidegger shares this understanding of a tension between "original discovery and its being averaged out and covered over." For Heidegger, this constitutes "truth in its most genuine sense" (Rouse, 1982, p. 276).
       Yet, as Kuhn implies, "extraordinary science" is not a goal for which the scientist strives. During periods of "extraordinary science," science practitioners turn to philosophy to seek answers to the paradigm crisis. However, writes Kuhn (1962): is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science.
       Once a field has made its transition, critical discourse recurs only at moments of crisis
       when the basis of the field are again in jeopardy. Only when they must choose between
       competing theories do scientists behave like philosophers. (p. 6-7)

       Indeed, scientists do not wish to be philosophers, for they are in the business of science, not philosophy. Therefore, in order to maintain the frame of the paradigm, the scientist must not "aim at unexpected novelty" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 35). In a sense, revolutionary science, for the scientist, is not good business practice. Revolutionary science is messy business. Therefore, scientists have a vested interest in the avoidance of critical thinking.
       The realists, such as Boyd, fight on the side of tradition, the technocratic thinking that binds science research and technology in the common project of the mathematization of nature. In order to do this effectively, the realist must deny the past; that is, present history as progressive such that the past understanding of the world is trivialized via an a-historical reading from the present. Essentially, this is what lies behind Boyd's rejection of Kuhn's conception of "incommensurability." Therefore, it is to the subject of history that we must now turn.


       Heidegger (1927/1962) draws a distinction between historiology and history (Geschichte). To understand this distinction, Heidegger points to the 'historicality' (Geschichtlichkeit) of Dasein, the human kind of being. For, the 'historicality' of Dasein arises from its temporal structure; that is, "it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 428).
       Historiology, as a "science of history," studies the events of the past such that history is understood as 'thing'-like and in which past events are 'contained.' The 'past' is understood as "no longer present-at-hand," or as "still present-at-hand" such that it cannot impact the 'present' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 378). History (Geschichte), rather than taking up the past as a sequence of events, is grounded in the "historicality" of Dasein - without which historiology would not be possible. The essence of history is understood as "destiny," a "sending" of Dasein on a path of disclosure of beings as given by Being.
       In "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger (1947/1993a) writes:

        History does not take place primarily as a happening. And its happening is not evanescence.
       The happening of history occurs essentially as the destiny of the truth of Being and from it.
        Being comes to destiny in that It, Being, gives itself. But thought in terms of such destiny this
        says: it gives itself and refuses itself simultaneously. (p. 239)

       "Destiny," as Heidegger understands the term, is understood in light of the "event of appropriation" (Ereignis). Ereignis is the event in which Being, as the "it gives," gives beings such that Dasein erupts as the clearing in which Being can presence. Human beings are called or claimed by Being to take up things, and, in doing so, are sent on a path of disclosure as destiny. The way that Being sends human beings has the character of history such that Being, by presenting beings, allows for a clearing (an epoch, world of disclosure) for a historical people. Yet, in furnishing beings, Being withdraws. It both "gives" and "refuses" simultaneously.
       Heidegger (1947/1993a) writes:

       Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this "less";
       rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the essential poverty of the
       shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of
       Being's truth. (p. 245)

       Heidegger understands 'truth' as aletheia or "unconcealment." Dasein is 'in truth' such that Dasein is called or claimed by Being to take up things in a certain way. In this unconcealment or uncovering, there is also a covering over, so that Dasein is both in 'truth' and in 'untruth."  Human beings are the "shepherds of Being" in that Being is "needful" of human beings. How is Being needful of human beings? Human beings are the clearing of Being, the "there" (Da) with which beings are appropriated as given by Being. As "ek-sisting," the human being "unfolds essentially in the throw of Being as the fateful sending" (Heidegger, 1993a, p. 231). It is this "fateful sending" which is history.
       Ereignis is not a specific historical event. In appropriating beings as given by Being, Dasein is sent on a path of disclosure as an "event" or happening which is the essence of Dasein as "ek-sisting." Dasein is radically temporal and it is this "historicality" of Dasein which makes history possible. Heidegger explicates the three temporal ecstacies of Dasein as the past (Gewesenheit or the mode of "having been"), present (Gegen-wart or "waiting-toward") and future (Zu-kunft or "coming-toward"), which are grounded in the existential of "care" (Sorge). Dasein's Being as care is its "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world)" (Heidegger, 1962).
       From the Heideggarian perspective of Dasein as radically temporal, history is essentially futural. Yet, traditionally, history is understood as an actual past. Nevertheless, from the above explication of Dasein's three temporal ekstases as grounded in its care structure, understanding is the "being-ahead of itself" which is the projection of future possibilities. Therefore, Dasein understands 'past' as the "having-been" in terms of its future possibilities. As Heidegger (1927/1962) explains in Being and Time:

       ...only in so far as Dasein is (as the having-been [bin-gewesen] of an 'I' that is) can it come
       towards (zukunftig) itself futurally in such a way that it comes back to itself. Dasein is, as
       authentically having-been, an authentically futural anticipation of one's utmost and ownmost
       possibility coming back, in an understanding way, to one's ownmost having-been. Dasein
       can only be what is has been insofar as it is futural. One's already having-been arises, in a
       certain way, from the future. (p. 373)

       The authentic disclosure of the past as having-been is understood as "repetition." From this concept of "repetition," it becomes possible to lay out Heidegger's notion of authentic history as destiny. When Being furnishes us with beings, it withdraws. Heidegger talks of this furnishing of beings by the "it gives" as a "turning" (kehre), with which there comes about a change in a historical world. As beings are given to human beings differently, human beings are called to disclose them differently. As human beings disclose beings differently, human beings are sent on a course of disclosure. This unfolding is the destiny which is history. This unfolding is "never a fate that compels," but calls or claims human beings to take up things within a finite realm of possibilities (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 330). Therefore, a taking up of the having-been as "repetition" can be understood as a retrieval or recovery such that it opens up a future. Authentic history, therefore, involves a going backward which goes forward such that Dasein takes up its heritage as a destiny and, by doing so, appropriates its throwness as its own. This involves a return to the origin to discover the moment of freedom at the heart of historical necessity.
       In the understanding of truth as aletheia or "unconcealment," Dasein is both in 'truth' and in 'untruth.' With the "event of appropriation," a particular historical people are claimed to take up beings in a certain way which both opens up certain possibilities while closing off other possibilities. This clearing of possibilities is what constitutes the epoch of a certain historical people. With this "turning," the 'world' changes. Things are taken up by human beings differently. Therefore, what things mean changes. Further, as things change, the 'total meaningfulness' of the 'worldhood of the world' changes. In turn, the human being, as the "there" of the clearing of Being, also changes. The human being understands herself differently.
       Based on this reading of Heidegger, we now have an provisional ontological ground upon which to understand Kuhn's notion of "incommensurability." In very concrete ways, Kuhn demonstrates that the "world" changes in particular periods of science. And it is with this notion that we can begin to understand the nature of Kuhn's ambiguity over the use of the term "world." The "world" which remains unchanged for Kuhn is, as Boss (1979) would say, the "world spanning openness" of the human being who is always already engaged with the "world" as a Being-in-the-world. Yet, the "world" as the "referential context of significance" changes with the "turning" of a historical moment when human beings take up things as given by Being with the "event of appropriation." Yet, this moment becomes "levelled down" by the "publicness" of "the they." The "they," as "publicness," disburdens Dasein by providing a "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" with which Dasein can understand the meaning of Being. Authentic disclosure, such as with revolutionary science, is always privative: an existential transformation of the "world" of "the they."
       As mentioned above, the disclosive character of "publicness" is characterized by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Idle talk, as the "circumscribed, prescribed Logos" of a particular historical epoch, disburdens Dasein of the recognition of its "uncanniness" as a "thrown Being- in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 233). In doing so, idle talk covers over Dasein's uncanniness as "not-at-home" in the world. Yet, what has been covered over in idle talk can only be accessed through a transformation of the covering. Authenticity is always an existential transformation of the "they." Further, it is through the "they," in which Dasein understands itself as everybody does, in which beings are taken up in a particular way. Therefore, authentic history, as a retrieval of the past as having-been in order to open up a future as being-towards, is a transformation of "publicness."
       Kuhn's historical reading of science can be understood as such a transformation, and this explains why he may be viewed as a threat to the project of "average everyday" science. To discard Kuhn as an "irrationalist" is, implicitly, a flight from thinking in order to maintain the framework of science and technology which, essentially, provides the structure to our "average everyday" world: how we understand ourselves and things. Yet, at the heart of this technocratic "they-self," human beings have become alienated.
       From Heidegger's understanding of Dasein's "fallenness" into the average everydayness of the "publicness" as the "they," human beings can be understood as estranged or alienated. Yet, in this context, alienation should not be understood as the kind of "alienation" which Marx speaks of. In this sense, Heidegger's understanding of Dasein as estranged from its ownmost possibilities is more closely related to the thinking of Freud and Nietzsche's understanding of the human being as radically de-centered, as unknown or lost to herself. This alienation is not the alienation of an 'encapsulated ego' which is estranged from itself by outside influences. "Publicness," as a character of das Man, is part of the ontological structure of the human kind of being.
       Particularly in Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of "publicness" in a derogatory way, largely from a position in which his understanding of "publicness" was developed in full view of our contemporary historical period as technological. Kuhn's project, in conjunction with this reading of Heidegger, provides a groundwork from which to discuss science in our modern, technological age. Yet, the value of Kuhn's historical approach, as read from this perspective, is that, at its core, it holds a liberatory potential which seems even to escape Kuhn's grasp. If we take seriously Heidegger's understanding of history as a retrieval of the having-been such that it opens up future possibilities, we may make the endeavor to retrieve from Heidegger's thinking a view of "publicness" and "idle talk" with which we may begin to build an understanding of science so that, in conclusion, we may address the question: "Can phenomenological science become a normal science?" I will wish to argue that, contrary to Hoeller (1978-79) there is an alternative route to answer this question apart from relying on early Heidegger's distinction between "inauthenticity" and "authenticity." To relegate phenomenological psychology to a role of "revolutionary science" as "authentic" is to place phenomenology in a role which is merely a reactionary role to the status quo, which, essentially, renders the discipline powerless to develop a community of practitioners who may begin an alternative human science. To follow this thought, it is necessary to further articulate how this "authentic-inauthentic" distinction can be taken up differently from the perspective of later Heideggarian thought.
       With the advent of a historical epoch, human beings take up things differently. How is it that the human being takes up things? Dasein takes up things as everybody does, as the "they." Gerede or idle talk is the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" of "publicness" with which Dasein understands the meaning of Being. This "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" provides human beings with context of a historically given intelligibility, without which the 'worldhood of the world' as "total meaningfulness" would not be possible. Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, is always already in a world alongside things and with others. As "Being-ahead-of-itself," Dasein is ahead of itself as already in a world. As Being-with, human beings are radically social. This is the significance of Aristotle's quote from Politics:

       Man is by nature a social animal; an individual who is unsocial naturally and not accidently
       is either beneath our notice of more than human. Society is something in nature that
       precedes the individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is so self-sufficient
       as not to need to, and therefore no partake of society, is either a beast or a god.
       (Aristotle, c. 328 BC)

       What does Aristotle mean when he says that "society...precedes the individual"? Aristotle is saying that society is not the sum total of an aggregate of individuals, but that the individual can only be understood  privatively. The individual emerges from the referential context of meaning of the world of her society, without which she could not survive. Similarly, Nietzsche (1882/1974) wrote that "truth is the kind error without which a species could not survive" (p. 172). The 'truth' of which Nietzsche speaks can be understood as the 'truth' of "publicness" which both uncovers and conceals beings as given by Being. It is a 'truth' which is also an 'untruth' or "error." Yet, without the intelligibility of the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos," one cannot survive, unless one is "either a beast or a god." Further, this is also the "truth" and "untruth" of Kuhn's notion of the "paradigm." Science, as a society of scientific practitioners, must practice together as a community. In order to do so, the implicit meaning and ground of the "paradigm" remains unquestioned so that research may go about its business of "normal science" without the chaos which would ensue if researchers were required to build this ground anew with each research project.
       The "error" of "publicness" is that it covers over its latent meaning and ground. What latent meaning and ground? Dasein's "uncanniness" as "not-at-home" as Being-in-the-world! In Dasein's concernful solicitude as the "they," it becomes tranquilized in the "at-homeness" of average everydayness, and, in doing so, flees from its authentic disclosure as being-towards- death. Dasein falls into the 'world' in fleeing from its "uncanniness" as thrown, as delivered over to Being without being the author of itself; that, as a null basis, Dasein is its basis. The "idle talk" of "publicness" is essentially death evasive. It covers over the mystery of Being and the wonder that there is something rather than nothing. Yet, Gerede can also be understood as a shelter which preserves the latent meaning and ground, and this can be understood from Heidegger's understanding of history as the retrieval of heritage as a destiny.
       Heidegger (1947/1993a) writes: is not only a living creature who possesses language along with other capacities.
       Rather, language is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he
       belongs to the truth of Being, guarding it. (p. 237).

       With Ereignis, Being gives us beings. With this giving, human beings are called to take up things as something, be it as world-gatherers, objects, or as resources. Human beings, in taking up things as something, appropriates things in terms of a "logos," the articulation of intelligibility. This dialogal, hermeneutical event occurs in language as "logos" which, as the grasping of something as something, sends the human being on a path of disclosure. "Language," writes Heidegger (1947/1993a), "is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself" (p. 230). Language, as making sense of what is given by Being, involves a constant interpretation. The language of this event (Ereignis) is the calling bringing into presence of the "mythos" (Sipiora, 1991). It is "mythos" which is the latent meaning and ground of the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" of publicness.
       It is from out of this understanding of the relationship between "mythos" and "logos" that we can begin to understand the meaning of 'culture.' Culture is the set of shared values, attitudes, customs, and physical objects that are maintained by a particular historical people. It is a design for living. This culture is visible as the 'world' of a historical people. How does this design for living come about? Culture answers the question of existence! Culture is the way a particular historical people make sense of the givens of existence by answering the question of existence. Thus, culture and publicness are interrelated. Publicness is the structure of culture. Thus, the "mythos" is the latent meaning and ground of the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" of a particular culture. Therefore, history (geschichte) is a "retrieval" of the past which opens up a future as a "retrieval" of the "mythos" as the latent meaning and ground of the "logos."
       History is the resolute taking up of one's heritage as a destiny.  It is a return to origins, to the "turning" when the "it gives" gave things differently, when human beings took things up differently, and when the world changed. "Freedom," writes Heidegger (1947/1993b), "is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts revealing on its way" (p. 330) History, therefore, is a return to the moment of freedom when things could have been taken up differently. It is a return to this moment of freedom as an origin; "the sending that gathers..., that first starts man upon the way of revealing destining [Geschick]" from which "the essence of all history [Geschichte] is determined" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 329). It is with this "turning," with the event (Ereignis), that the "mythos" of a particular epoch emerges. The "mythos" is the sending, the latent meaning and ground of the Gerede or "circumscribed, prescribed Logos" which emerges from it to create a new epoch and, with it, a different culture. The "mythos" is different for each culture. It is also different, in another sense, with each scientific "paradigm" embedded in the larger "mythos" of a historical people. For the most part, the "myth" of the scientific paradigm guides the thought of the scientific community in such a way that it maintains an invisibility. Scientists find themselves always already in a particular "paradigm" which guides the practice of their research. As Feyerabend (1981) writes:

       The method of education often consists of some basic myth...Knowing the myth the grown-up
        can explain almost everything (or else he can turn to experts for more detailed understanding).
        He is the master of Nature and of Society. He understands themboth and knows how to interact
        with them. However, he is not the master of the myth that guides his understanding. (p. 163).

       The relationship between gerede and myth are different for each epoch. It is from this place that we can understand that there are at least two extreme possibilities for the relationship between gerede and myth. On the one extreme, we can understand gerede as the 'common sense' of a historical people which shelters and preserves the 'sensus communis.' In this case, the 'common sense' serves the purpose of being a container which preserves the 'sensus communis' so that it can be retrieved. Through the retrieval of the 'sensus communis,' the community is reoriented through a transformation of the everydayness of 'common sense' through a ritual recovery. This kind of ritual recovery, for example, is evident in Eliade's (1957/1959) description of "religious man" in The Sacred and the Profane. "The time of origin of a reality," writes Eliade,

       -that is, the time inaugurated by the first appearance of the reality - has a paradigmatic
       value and function; that is why man seeks to reactualize it periodically by means of
       appropriate rituals (p. 85).

       Through ritual, a culture allows for an opening in the 'at-homeness' of everydayness through an existential transformation of everydayness by which 'common sense' becomes "uncanny" and in which the 'sensus communis' may shine forth as the latent meaning and ground. Certainly, Eliade (1957/1959) makes this evident in his descriptions of, for example, the festivals of the Australian Arunta and the Polynesian people of Tikiopia.
       At the other extreme, a historical people may experience the "mythos" as a lack or as 'unconscious.' In these cases, the 'common sense' of a culture denies its "mythos" as its latent meaning and ground. The everyday, functional discourse of the "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" disallows any other kind of discourse. Yet, there is cost for the culture in doing so. One of the great lessons of psychoanalysis serves well in elaborating this cost. Psychoanalysis teaches that the repressed always returns in the form of symptom. Therefore, we can say that what has been denied in the 'sensus communis' and the 'mythos' disrupts everydayness as a symptomatic return of the repressed.
       Following the lead of Heidegger, thinkers such as van den Berg (1961, 1970, 1971), Boss (1994/1979), Romanyshyn (1978, 1982, 1985, 1989),  Kugelmann (1992), Sipiora (1990, 1991, 1994) and Robbins (1997) all agree that the epoch of our contemporary culture, as a technological age governed by "calculative thinking," is just such a culture. In our technological age, we deny the "mythos" as the latent meaning and ground of our functional everydayness. In turn, we suffer the consequences with symptoms, such as meaninglessness, boredom, loneliness, fear and depression. We are a society which has forgotten its heritage as its destiny.
       In our technological age, Being presences as the "Enframing" (Gestell). "The essence of technology is nothing technological," writes Sipiora (1991) on Heidegger: is not a product of human making or an activity under human control. Rather technology -
       in the broad and fundamental sense in which Heidegger conceives of it - is a presence of
       Being which provokesthe disclosure of the whole of their beings in terms of their use value.
       (p. 241).

       The "Enframing" is the essence of technology which precedes the technological world of our culture. The "Enframing" is the latent meaning and ground, the "mythos," of our "prescribed, circumscribed Logos" as the "calculative thinking" of "means-end" rationality. Technology is the "mode of revealing" in which truth, as aletheia, happens in our particular historical epoch (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 319). This 'truth,' as the "Enframing," is the "it gives" which presents beings as "standing-reserve." It is "the gathering together of the setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 325).
       Yet, this sending in the mode of "enframing" presents a "supreme danger" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 332). As we take up things as "standing-reserve" or 'resources,' we come "to the very brink of a precipitous fall" in which we ourselves are taken as "standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 332). Yet, at the same time, we understand ourselves as "lords of the earth." We fail to see ourselves as claimed by Being. Further, "Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding sway of truth" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 333). In the discourse of "means-end" rationality, everything is reduced to quantifiable resources, including human beings, and all other kinds of discourse are disallowed. As a result, our world has become an "unworld," characterized by a "circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption," which lacks a human context (Heidegger, 1973, p. 43). We become "homeless" as we are alienated from the 'essence' of what it means to be human.
       If we understand history as a retrieval of the past as "what-is-as-having-been" which opens up a future as a destiny, we are a culture in desperate need of history. Yet, history as such has been denied. Historiology has replaced history as a focus on a succession of actual events. Technological culture is a-historical. Through the "myth of progress," technology promises power over all things, including death. Yet, as a result, the past is denied as the "having-been" which may be "retrieved" in the present as a "waiting-toward" which opens up a future as "coming-toward." Instead, the present becomes a mere succession of "nows." The "calculative thinking" of our historical "logos" denies us the possibility of retrieving our heritage as a destiny. And it is with Kuhn's conception of "incommensurability" that he intuitively grasps this denial, and that, in the spirit of Geschichte, he attempts a retrieval of the past with his historical reading of science. Heidegger takes a somewhat different approach. For Heidegger, the alternative is "meditative thinking."
       The two characteristics of Heidegger's (1996) "meditative thinking" are "releasement toward things" and "openness to the mystery." "Releasement toward things" is a stance toward technology which is both a "yes" and a "no" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 54). We cannot merely stop what we are doing, yet we can "ponder" the "possible rise of the saving power" of technology through a retrieval or recollection in which "we watch over it" (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 337). Doing so, we are able to step back from "calculative thinking" and dwell poetically with the understanding that, as Holderlan wrote: "where the danger is, grows the saving power also..." (Heidegger, 1993b, p. 340).  "Openness to the mystery" is a move toward the wonderment that there is something rather than nothing. It is the recognition that technology erupts from the concealing-revealing presencing of Being as the "it gives" which gives us beings as "standing- reserve." It is the recognition that we are not "lords of the earth," but that we are called or claimed by Being to take up things such that they gather a world. We are the "shepherds of Being." We recognize that we are finite beings who must listen in to the call of being so that we might hear the "turning" in which Being sends us on a path of disclosure as a destiny. Thus, through "meditative thinking," we are granted the promise of "a new ground and foundation upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it" (Heidegger, 1996, p. 55).  Through "meditative thinking," history is again made possible.
       In conclusion, a genuine history is, essentially, "meditative" thinking, since it is a thinking which allows for a transformation of "average everydayness." History is necessary because:

       ...the self-interpretation of normal science turns out to be inadequate, for normal science
       conceals this vulnerability to disruption from us. It projects its methods and equipment as
       capable of being extended to solve any problem which it encounters, and its failure to do
       so at any point is unintelligible to it. (Rouse, 1981, p. 284).

       By his appeal to history in order to understanding the social character of modern science, Kuhn's (1962) Structure, if for only a moment, glances across the abyss of science and history to the possibility of taking up the organization of knowledge in a different way. Ultimately, however, the end goal for Kuhn is normal science. However, a return to the discourse of scientific thinking is a return to the kind of gerede that, once again, denies its meaning and ground. Scientific discourse is always "mathematical" in the sense of its original meaning: "that 'about' things which we really already know" such that "we do not first get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us" (Heidegger, 1967, p. 74). Further, in order to carry out its project, the "calculative thinking" of science, as the ground of science and technology, denies other forms of discourse, including history. As I've tried to show, this need not be the only kind of discourse. Gerede is part of the structure of the human kind of being. There is no getting rid of it. Yet, we can also imagine the possibility of a discourse which allows for a ritual recovery of the hidden meaning and ground; which, as a "referential context of significance," includes the possibility of transformation.


       Hoeller's (1978-79) critique of Giorgi's appeal to a phenomenological psychology as a human science relies on Kuhn's notion of "normal science." Hoeller shows that Giorgi's "major goal is to show that psychology can be both humanistic and scientific" (p. 168). This, indeed, appears to be the case, as Giorgi (1970) writes: is precisely the prejudice that Third Force psychology must be either antiscientific or
       nonscientific that we would like to challenge. Consequently, both the term "human" and
       the term "science" are important to us. We would insist upon the relevance of the term
       human to those who want to build a psychology of the human person according to the
       conception of science as developed by the natural sciences and who adhere rigidly to that
       concept despite changes in subject matter. We would insist upon the relevance of science
       for those who want to study the humanistic aspects of man without any concern for method
       or rigor whatsoever. (p. xii).

       In order to create a "human science" psychology, Giorgi appeals to a fulfillment of "the aims of science" (Giorgi, 1970, p. xii). Yet, as Hoeller so adeptly points out, there is an extreme danger here. This danger, by now, should be evident based on the above discussion. The term "science" is charged with the latent meaning of research as the laying out of a blueprint of nature, which, regardless of its inclusion of mere numbers, is "mathematical" in character.
       This danger becomes even more evident when Giorgi (1970) appeals to Kuhn in order to support his argument for the taking up of psychology as a "human science." Giorgi wants to argue that phenomenological psychology, as a "human science," should be the next "paradigm" of "normal science" for psychology. He writes:

       Perhaps the clearest way to communicating our intention is to state, in Kuhn's terms,
       psychology needs another paradigm. We feel that the paradigm within which psychology
       has been laboring has reached the limits of its usefulness, and that it is time to find a
       new paradigm... (p. 197).

       Yet, Giorgi seems to be naive to the possibility that phenomenological psychology, as a "normal science," contradicts the notion of the phenomenological method: "To let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger, 1927, p. 58).  Hoeller (1978-79), therefore, argues that the adoption of phenomenological psychology as a paradigm of "normal science" would ultimately cease to be phenomenological or "human" (p. 170). "(It) would have ceased to have the essence of phenomenology, for it would become all the things it presently aims against" (Hoeller, 1978-79, p. 170). Instead, Hoeller argues that phenomenological psychological should aim to be "a permanently revolutionary science, which is to say, according to Heidegger and Kuhn, it would have ceased to be 'science'" (p. 170).
       Hoeller is on the right track, but he does not realize that his argument contains an inherent contradiction. To appeal to a phenomenological psychology which is "authentic" as a "revolutionary science," which is therefore opposed to an "inauthentic" psychology as a "normal science," is to have already brought it into the frame of the "science" which Hoeller, along with Heidegger and Kuhn, critiques. The end result is that Hoeller perpetuates the marginalization of a phenomenological discourse in psychology. He places it in a position by which, within the "calculative" frame of science and technology, it becomes relegated to the netherworld of chaos between the "paradigms" of "normal science" psychology. Hoeller places phenomenological psychology in a position where it becomes a psychology of mere crisis, rather than a psychology that allows for the possibility of transformation of its latent meaning and ground.
       The "inauthentic-authentic" distinction belongs to the work of an early Heidegger who, in Being and Time, revealed the provisional ontology of the human being of our modern, technological era governed by "calculative thinking." The derogatory cast of gerede as "inauthentic" belongs to the alienating discourse of our scientific epoch which denies all other forms of discourse. As I've demonstrated above, there lies the possibility of another kind of gerede: a discourse which allows both for a community to work together at a common project and to engage in a "meditative thinking" which listens in to the meaning and ground of the "referential context of significance" which guides their thought. This ideal, not mere revolutionary science, should be the goal of phenomenological psychology. And, as I've argued, this must be a phenomenological psychology which understands the human being as radically social and radically historical. This is also a phenomenological psychology, in distinction from Hoeller's critique, which does not cease to be a science, but which holds to the "releasement toward things" characterized by "meditative thinking." It is both a "yes" and "no" to science: a human science research, which, "in its successes and in the indefinitely open possibility of its partial failure, is already in the truth" (Rouse, 1982, p. 288). In contradistinction, Hoeller proposes a psychology which holds to the impossible ideal of an a-social psychology fit only for "a beast or a god."


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Copyright 1999, Brent Dean Robbins

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